The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents one of the most significant bilateral initiatives in South Asia’s modern history. With over 60 billion dollars in planned investments, CPEC has the potential to transform Pakistan’s infrastructure, energy, and industrial base. Yet its progress has not been without obstacles. Security threats, political instability, and local resistance have collectively affected timelines, increased costs, and occasionally strained public perception. Understanding these challenges is crucial for evaluating both the risks and long-term sustainability of CPEC.
Militancy and Security Threats
Nature and Scale of the Threat
CPEC’s vast geographical scope stretches from Gwadar in Balochistan to Khunjerab in Gilgit-Baltistan. Many of these areas have historically faced security challenges due to separatist or militant movements. Attacks targeting Chinese nationals and CPEC-linked infrastructure have occurred intermittently since 2015, though the frequency has decreased in recent years due to improved security coordination.
According to Pakistan’s Interior Ministry (2024), a total of 62 people working on CPEC-related projects were killed between 2020 and 2024, including both Chinese and Pakistani nationals. These incidents took place mainly in Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, provinces that have seen sporadic militant activity. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and related groups have claimed responsibility for several such attacks, often justifying their actions as opposition to federal control over local resources.
The 2021 Dasu hydropower project attack was among the most high-profile incidents, killing 9 Chinese engineers and 4 Pakistani workers. The attack was later traced to transnational elements linked to anti-state militant networks. Following joint investigations, Pakistan and China enhanced coordination between their counterterrorism agencies and strengthened route security across key corridors.
Security Measures and Response
To protect over 10,000 Chinese nationals currently working in Pakistan, the government established a Special Security Division (SSD) comprising approximately 15,000 personnel, including Army, Frontier Corps, and Police units. This force is specifically tasked with protecting CPEC infrastructure, personnel, and logistics convoys.
In addition to military protection, surveillance drones, safe routes, and joint coordination centers have been introduced in collaboration with Chinese security experts. These efforts have led to a measurable decline in major attacks since late 2022. Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning reported that security incidents along CPEC routes decreased by over 40 percent between 2022 and 2024.
The government has also worked to address root causes of unrest through development-focused initiatives in Balochistan, including the Gwadar Smart Port City Plan, vocational training programs, and public welfare investments intended to integrate local communities into CPEC’s benefits.
Political Instability and Governance Challenges
Policy Continuity Across Governments
CPEC was launched in 2015 during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s tenure and has since spanned multiple governments. Each administration has generally reaffirmed its commitment to CPEC, but changes in political leadership have caused policy adjustments and delays in implementation. Projects under the Phase I Early Harvest Plan progressed rapidly between 2015 and 2019, focusing on energy and transport. However, Phase II, which centers on industrial cooperation and agriculture, has advanced more slowly due to governance transitions.
For instance, the change of government in 2022 led to a temporary pause in several new projects while the new administration reviewed fiscal frameworks and re-evaluated debt exposure. These reviews are part of responsible governance, but they slowed decision-making and created uncertainty for investors.
Despite such pauses, CPEC remains a bipartisan commitment, enshrined in Pakistan’s long-term Vision 2025 plan and reaffirmed by the Pakistan-China Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). The 11th JCC meeting in October 2023 approved six new development projects worth over 6.5 billion dollars, including the Karachi Circular Railway, Gwadar Power Plant, and several Special Economic Zones (SEZs). This continuity demonstrates the resilience of the program despite political transitions.
Institutional and Administrative Hurdles
CPEC’s complexity requires coordination between multiple federal ministries, provincial governments, and Chinese agencies. Administrative bottlenecks in land acquisition, environmental approvals, and project financing have occasionally slowed implementation. To address this, the government has created the CPEC Authority, which centralizes project oversight and fast-tracks clearances.
While this authority has improved coordination, experts still cite the need for greater efficiency in inter-ministerial communication and public sector accountability. Transparency and predictable regulatory frameworks will be crucial for maintaining investor confidence and ensuring long-term success.
Local Resistance and Socioeconomic Concerns
Land and Compensation Issues
CPEC’s infrastructure projects require large-scale land acquisitions, affecting thousands of families. Although the government offers compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, some local communities argue that payments are delayed or undervalued. In parts of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, villagers have protested for fairer compensation and greater inclusion in project planning.
In response, authorities have initiated consultative mechanisms with community leaders and local assemblies. For example, in Gwadar, a Joint Coordination Committee for Local Affairs was created in 2023 to address employment, water supply, and compensation grievances. Such mechanisms are intended to foster dialogue rather than confrontation.
Environmental and Livelihood Concerns
Local resistance is not limited to land disputes. Some groups have raised concerns about environmental degradation, such as increased air pollution from coal power plants or disruptions to marine ecosystems due to port expansion. Pakistan’s Ministry of Climate Change has since mandated that all new CPEC energy projects undergo Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) consistent with international standards.
On the livelihood side, the government has launched Gwadar Fishermen Development Programs, designed to provide alternative income sources, training, and infrastructure for coastal communities affected by port construction. The long-term plan includes employment quotas for local residents in CPEC-related industries, aiming to ensure that benefits are shared equitably.
Perceptions and Inclusion
Perception plays a major role in shaping the local response. When residents see visible economic benefits, public sentiment improves. The recent Gwadar East Bay Expressway and Pak-China Friendship Hospital have increased local employment and access to healthcare, improving trust in the project. Continued investment in social services is essential for ensuring that local populations view CPEC as a partnership, not an imposition.
Balancing Security and Development
Pakistan’s approach toward CPEC security has evolved from reactive protection to proactive engagement. Instead of relying solely on military protection, the government increasingly emphasizes community inclusion and socioeconomic uplift as the foundation of long-term stability.
China, for its part, has remained supportive and patient, viewing security challenges as part of the natural learning curve of a complex international partnership. Beijing continues to finance key projects through a mix of concessional loans and direct investment, with a growing focus on green energy, agriculture, and digital cooperation under the next phase of CPEC.
Conclusion
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor continues to hold immense potential, but its success depends on effectively managing security and political challenges. Militancy, political transitions, and local grievances have tested Pakistan’s institutional capacity, yet they have also prompted reforms in security coordination, governance transparency, and local engagement.
The government’s establishment of specialized security units, renewed focus on provincial inclusion, and China’s continued commitment demonstrate that both nations are intent on making CPEC a lasting success. Overcoming these challenges requires consistency, communication, and shared trust. If Pakistan continues strengthening its institutions and community engagement, CPEC can evolve from a symbol of foreign investment into a genuine driver of inclusive national development.