2026-11-17
LyondellBasell is one of the world’s largest makers of plastics and chemicals. It cracks cheap U.S. ethane and other feedstocks into ethylene and propylene, then turns them into polyethylene and polypropylene resins sold to packaging, auto, construction and consumer-goods makers. A second engine, Intermediates and Derivatives, makes propylene oxide, oxyfuels (gasoline blending components) and solvents. It also runs Advanced Polymer Solutions and a technology licensing arm. The company closed its Houston refinery in 2025, sold select European assets in May 2026, and halved its dividend in February 2026 after one of the longest chemical downturns in its history. Profits are deeply cyclical.
- Intrinsic value, DCF: $88 per share (range $60 to $124)
- Intrinsic value, MEV: $62.50 per share (range $43 to $85)
- Blended fair value: $71 per share (range $55 to $85)
- PE (trailing 12 months, GAAP EPS $3.97): 15.4x. Distorted by write-downs and a $734 million loss on the European sale.
- PE (trailing, excluding identified items, $7.08): 8.6x. Flattered by a 2026 supply shock.
- PE on normalized EPS ($6.25): 9.8x. A fair multiple for a commodity chemical maker.
- PEG (9.8x divided by 3% per-share growth): 3.3. Growth does not support the price.
- PEGY (adds 4.5% yield, 9.8 / 7.5): 1.3. Closer to fair once the dividend is counted.
At-a-Glance Scorecard
| Item | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Business model simple and sustainable? | Yes, simple; sustainability depends on feedstock edge |
| Moat present? | Narrow. U.S. low-cost ethane, scale, licensed process technology |
| Management competent and aligned? | Mixed. Good restructuring; 2025 payout funded with debt |
| Intrinsic value, DCF (range) | $60 to $124, base $88 |
| Intrinsic value, MEV (range) | $43 to $85, base $62.50 |
| PE / PEG | 9.8x normalized, 15.4x GAAP trailing / PEG 3.3 |
| Price versus intrinsic value | Undervalued by about 14% versus $71 blended |
| Margin of safety | About 14%; thin for a leveraged cyclical |
| Free cash flow strong? | No in 2025; recovering in 2026 |
| Balance sheet strong? | Adequate. Net debt about $9.1 billion; investment grade |
| Biggest single risk | Global polyolefin overcapacity keeps margins low for years |
| Buy price, 9% per year over 16 years | $53 including dividends ($24.50 on price alone) |
| Still buy if market closed 5 years? | Only below about $50 |
| Snapshot verdict | Hold; not a buy at $61 |
Inputs used to calculate intrinsic value:
- Diluted shares: 323 million (Q3 2026)
- Normalized EPS: $6.25 (range $4.75 to $7.75)
- Normalized EBITDA: $4.5 billion (range $3.5 billion to $5.5 billion)
- Owner earnings base: $6.50 per share (about $2.1 billion)
- Net debt: about $9.1 billion, excluding $1.3 billion of leases (estimate, September 30, 2026)
- DCF discount rate: 10%; terminal growth: 2%
- Growth: 3% per year in years 1 to 5, 2.5% in years 6 to 10
- MEV: 10x normalized EPS (range 9x to 11x)
Data Sources and Integrity
| Fiscal year | Revenue ($M) | Net income ($M) | Diluted EPS ($) | Implied diluted shares (M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 29,183 | 3,837 | 9.13 | about 420 |
| 2017 | 34,484 | 4,879 | 12.23 | about 399 |
| 2018 | 39,004 | 4,690 | 12.01 | about 390 |
| 2019 | 34,727 | 3,397 | 9.58 | about 355 |
| 2020 | 27,753 | 1,427 | 4.24 | about 337 |
| 2021 | 46,173 | 5,617 | 16.75 | about 335 |
| 2022 | 50,451 | 3,889 | 11.81 | about 329 |
| 2023 | 41,107 | 2,121 | 6.46 | about 328 |
| 2024 | 40,302 | 1,367 | 4.15 | 326 |
| 2025 | 30,153 | (738) | (2.34) | 322 |
| 9M 2026 | 24,873 | 1,442 | 4.42 | 323 |
Excluding identified items, EPS was $6.22 in 2024, $1.70 in 2025 and $7.34 in the first nine months of 2026. The 2025 revenue excludes the closed refinery; 2024 restated on the same basis is $33,394 million. The ten-year average diluted EPS (2016 to 2025) is $8.40, but the earlier years include assets the company no longer owns.
Deep Dive
Business Understanding
LyondellBasell earns a spread between feedstock cost and product price. Its advantage is location: U.S. crackers run on ethane from shale gas, which has historically been far cheaper than the naphtha used in Europe and Asia. When oil is high and gas is cheap, U.S. polyethylene makers earn fat margins. When new capacity floods the market, as Chinese and U.S. builds did from 2022, margins collapse for everyone. Demand grows roughly with global GDP; pricing does not. Revenue swung from $27.8 billion in 2020 to $50.5 billion in 2022 and back to $30.2 billion in 2025. Net income ranged from a $738 million loss to a $5.6 billion profit.
The 2026 picture is unusually noisy. A geopolitical supply shock produced the strongest margin quarter in years in Q2 2026, and Q3 oxyfuels profits surged on higher gasoline crack spreads tied to global supply disruptions. Neither is a base to capitalize.
What would kill it? Nothing quick. The risks are persistent Chinese overcapacity, plastics regulation and a narrowing U.S. gas-to-oil cost gap. The likelier fate is mediocre returns, not failure.
Competitive Advantage and Positioning
The moat is narrow and partly geological. U.S. ethane-based assets sit near the bottom of the global cost curve. The company is also among the largest polypropylene producers and licenses its polyolefin process technology to rivals, a small but high-return business. Competitors include Dow, ExxonMobil Chemical, Chevron Phillips, SABIC, INEOS, Borealis and Chinese state producers. There are no switching costs for commodity resins and little brand power; buyers purchase on price and reliability. The moat is shrinking in Europe, where management has sold or closed assets including the Brindisi polypropylene plant, and stable in the U.S., though new capacity has eroded pricing power. Dow cut its dividend about seven months earlier, so the pressure is industry-wide.
Financial Strength: Profitability
There is no consistent growth. Per-share earnings peaked at $16.75 in 2021 and have not regained 2018 levels outside a single boom year. The best feature of the record is the share count, which fell from about 420 million in 2016 to 322 million, lifting per-share results even as total profits stagnated. Margins swing hard. Net margin was about 12% in 2021 and negative in 2025. LyondellBasell’s margins have usually been above European peers and comparable to Dow’s, thanks to its U.S. feedstock mix. Return on invested capital was high in 2016 to 2018 and again in 2021 (exact figures unverified), then fell steadily. A recent stockanalysis.com snapshot put trailing ROIC at 5.4% and ROE at 7.4%, below any reasonable cost of capital. The 2026 recovery will lift these figures, but the trend over five years is down.
Financial Strength: Balance Sheet
The balance sheet is serviceable but no longer a fortress. At June 30, 2026, long-term debt was $11.2 billion and the current portion $1.5 billion. The company repaid a €500 million note in September and ended Q3 with $3.2 billion of cash and $7.7 billion of total liquidity. Estimated net debt of about $9.1 billion equals roughly 2.0x normalized EBITDA, but it was about 3.6x 2025 EBITDA excluding identified items.
Management describes an investment-grade rating as the foundation of its capital allocation. The dividend cut was explicitly made to protect it, saving about $900 million a year.
Red flags: total debt rose in 2025 while earnings collapsed, and the company recorded $972 million of goodwill impairments in 2025. Pension obligations are not material to the thesis (unverified).
Margin of Safety
The stock trades about 14% below a blended fair value of $71. That is not enough. If my valuation were 20% to 30% too high, fair value would be $50 to $57, and the stock would be modestly overpriced. For a leveraged commodity business with low valuation confidence, I would want a discount of 30% or more, which implies a price near $50.
Mispricing Thesis
The market is pricing LyondellBasell at a modest discount because it has lost faith in the mid-cycle. Three things weigh on the shares: a dividend cut that drove income investors out, a structural glut of polyolefin capacity, and doubts that 2026’s improvement is more than a geopolitical windfall. The shares traded between $41.58 and $83.94 in the year to September 2026, a sign of how unsure investors are.
The 2025 trough and the 2026 shock are temporary; overcapacity is structural and may take until late in the decade to absorb. What closes the gap is evidence of normal earnings: integrated U.S. polyethylene margins ended Q3 about 50% above 2025 levels, and the Cash Improvement Plan targets $1.3 billion of cash benefits by year-end 2026. Sustained free cash flow and falling debt through 2027 would earn a higher multiple.
Management and Capital Allocation
Chief executive Peter Vanacker, appointed in 2022, has made hard and broadly correct decisions: closing the Houston refinery, exiting weak European assets, cutting fixed costs and right-sizing the dividend.
The record is blemished. Through 2025 the board kept paying $1.37 a quarter and bought back $201 million of stock while free cash flow covered a fraction of both, borrowing the difference. The 2016 to 2020 buybacks were value-accretive, but the 2018 A. Schulman acquisition disappointed; the 2025 goodwill impairment largely reflects the polymer solutions business it created (attribution unverified).
Executive pay and insider ownership could not be verified this session. Alignment is therefore rated mixed.
Long-Term Outlook
In 5 to 10 years LyondellBasell should be a leaner, more U.S.-focused company with lower fixed costs. Plastics demand will keep growing with population and income. Regulation of single-use plastics trims growth at the margin but does not threaten the core.
In a recession, volumes and margins would fall together, as in 2020 and 2025. The company would likely protect its rating by cutting capex; a second dividend cut cannot be ruled out.
Risk Assessment
- Structural overcapacity in polyethylene and polypropylene, mainly from China
- Narrowing U.S. gas-to-oil price advantage
- Leverage: a prolonged trough could pressure the investment-grade rating
- European exposure, even after divestments
- Regulation of plastics and carbon costs
- Earnings that depend on events, such as the 2026 supply shock, rather than durable improvement
Red Flag Scan
| Flag | Finding |
|---|---|
| Declining free cash flow | Yes, 2021 to 2025; partial recovery in 2026 |
| Rising debt without rising earnings | Yes, in 2025 |
| Misaligned management pay | Not verified |
| Serial acquisitions | No; the problem was one costly deal (A. Schulman) |
| Accounting complexity | Moderate. Frequent “identified items”, write-downs, discontinued operations |
| Moat erosion | Yes, in Europe; stable in the U.S. |
| Customer or product concentration | Moderate. Heavy reliance on polyolefins |
| Other: dividend paid from debt | Yes, in 2025 |
Disconfirming Evidence
The bear case, argued as a short seller: this is a commodity producer in the third year of an industry downturn whose management kept paying an unaffordable dividend until it was forced to halve it. Return on capital has been below its cost for two years. The 2026 earnings rebound came from a geopolitical shock and a gasoline-blending windfall, not from better structure. China keeps adding capacity regardless of returns. Net debt of about $9 billion leaves little room if margins slip back to 2025 levels. “Identified items”, such as the $734 million loss on the European sale, are real losses of shareholder capital.
The bull rebuttal: the low-cost U.S. assets are real, the worst assets are gone, and polyethylene margins have risen sharply. A normal year could produce $6 to $8 of EPS.
On balance the bear case is stronger at $61. The business will probably recover, but the price does not pay enough for the uncertainty.
Scenario Valuations
| Scenario | Normalized EPS | Per-share growth | Exit PE / discount rate | EBITDA margin | Intrinsic value | Entry condition | Exit condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $4.25 | 1% | 8x / 11% | about 10% | $43 | Recession or prolonged glut; price under $35 | Price above $55 |
| Base | $6.25 | 3%, then 2.5% | 10x / 10% | about 13% | $71 (blend) | Mid-cycle; price $50 or less | Price above $85 |
| Bull | $8.25 | 4%, then 3% | 12x / 9% | about 16% | $100 to $135 | Capacity closures, sustained U.S. advantage; price under $65 | Price above $120 |
Valuation Discipline
- Discount rate 10%: one point above the 9% hurdle, reflecting deep cyclicality and moderate leverage.
- Terminal growth 2%: below long-run nominal global GDP of about 4% to 5%, appropriate for a mature commodity producer.
- Owner earnings growth: 3% per year in years 1 to 5 (volume growth near GDP plus cost savings), 2.5% in years 6 to 10. No buybacks are assumed while debt is reduced.
- Normalized EPS for MEV: normalized EBITDA of $4.5 billion, roughly the average of 2023, 2024 and 2025 excluding identified items plus the 2026 run rate, less D&A of $1.5 billion and interest of $0.45 billion, taxed at 20%, divided by 322 million shares, equals $6.25. This sits well below the ten-year average of $8.40 because the asset base and industry structure have weakened.
DCF sensitivity ($ per share):
| Growth (years 1 to 5) | 8% discount | 10% discount | 12% discount |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1% | 101 | 76 | 61 |
| 3% | 117 | 88 | 70 |
| 5% | 137 | 101 | 80 |
Reconciliation: the DCF ($88) exceeds MEV ($62.50) by about 40%, beyond the 25% threshold. The DCF assumes steady owner earnings in perpetuity and that maintenance capex stays below depreciation, an unverified split. The MEV implicitly prices in cyclical troughs and leverage through a 10x multiple. I weight MEV 65% and DCF 35%, giving $71, because this is a commodity business where cycles matter more than terminal values.
Buy Price and Margin of Safety
Method: normalized EPS of $6.25 grows 3% a year for 10 years and 2.5% thereafter, exits at 10x, and is discounted at the target rate. The 16-year exit value is about $97 per share. “With dividends” adds the present value of a 45% payout, close to today’s $2.76 annual dividend. Results are estimates within a range of roughly plus or minus 25%.
Buy prices over 16 years:
| Target annual return | Projected exit value | Max buy price (price only) | Max buy price (with dividends) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5% | $97 | $45 | $83 |
| 6% | $97 | $38 | $74 |
| 7% | $97 | $33 | $66 |
| 8% | $97 | $28 | $59 |
| 9% | $97 | $24.50 | $53 |
| 10% | $97 | $21 | $48 |
Buy prices at 9% per year:
| Horizon | Projected exit value | Max buy price (price only) | Max buy price (with dividends) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 years | $72.50 | $47 | $59 |
| 7 years | $77 | $42 | $58 |
| 10 years | $84 | $35.50 | $56 |
| 12 years | $88 | $31.50 | $55 |
| 14 years | $93 | $27.50 | $54 |
| 16 years | $97 | $24.50 | $53 |
At $61 the implied 16-year return is about 7.7% a year including dividends, or 3.0% on price alone. The stock does not meet the 9% goal.
Sell Discipline
Thesis triggers for trimming or exit:
- A second dividend cut, or a downgrade below investment grade
- Net debt above 3x normalized EBITDA for more than a year
- Free cash flow below the dividend for two consecutive years after 2026
- New large acquisitions or major growth capex before debt is reduced
- Evidence the U.S. feedstock advantage is closing, such as sustained high U.S. gas prices
Valuation trigger: trim above $85, the top of the blended range, because the price would then assume bull-case margins. Exit above $100, where only the bull case justifies the price.
Risk and Opportunity Profile
Scores run 1 to 10, where 10 is most favorable (lowest risk, highest opportunity).
| Risk sub-factor | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Financial stability | 0.30 | 5 |
| Earnings volatility | 0.20 | 2 |
| Business model risk | 0.20 | 4 |
| Macro sensitivity | 0.15 | 2 |
| Market risk | 0.15 | 5 |
| Risk Score | 3.8 |
A Risk Score of 3.8 signals elevated risk. Drivers: earnings volatility, macro sensitivity and only middling financial stability.
| Opportunity sub-factor | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Growth potential | 0.30 | 3 |
| Unit economics | 0.20 | 5 |
| Competitive advantage | 0.20 | 5 |
| Valuation asymmetry | 0.20 | 6 |
| Catalysts | 0.10 | 6 |
| Opportunity Score | 4.7 |
An Opportunity Score of 4.7 is below average. Some recovery upside exists, but low growth caps it. Drivers: growth potential, valuation asymmetry and catalysts.
Classification
Growth stage: stable to slowly declining in total earnings power, with per-share results supported only when buybacks resume.
Peter Lynch: a cyclical. He would note that the stock looked expensive on 2025’s depressed earnings, which is often when cyclicals are worth buying, and cheap on 2026’s adjusted figures, which may be a false signal. The best entry was near the $41.58 low of the past year.
Charlie Munger: too hard. A commodity product, no pricing power, heavy capital needs, leverage and earnings driven by feedstock spreads and geopolitics. Munger would likely pass.
Summary and Verdict
LyondellBasell owns low-cost U.S. assets and has taken painful but sensible steps to shrink and strengthen. It is also a commodity producer in an oversupplied industry, carrying about $9 billion of net debt, whose recent earnings owe much to temporary disruption. On normalized EPS of about $6.25, fair value is $55 to $85, centered on $71.
Verdict: Hold for existing owners; do not buy at $61.
- Buy below: $50 to $53
- Fair value range: $55 to $85
- Trim above: $85
- Sell above: $100
At $61 the stock does not meet the goal of 9% a year over 16 years; the implied return is about 7.7% including dividends. It would meet the goal at about $53 or below, counting dividends.
Disclaimer: This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Always perform your own due diligence or consult with a financial advisor before making investment decisions.

